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Abstract
While research into default reasoning is extensive and many default intuitions are commonly held,
no one system has yet captured all these intuitions nor given a formal account to motivate them. This
paper argues that the extended maximum entropy approach which incorporates variable strength
defaults provides a benchmark for default reasoning that is not only objectively motivated but also
satisfies all the accepted default intuitions. It is shown that the behaviour of the approach coincides
with a wide range of default intuitions taken from examples in the literature, and can be used to
explain why some examples have led to confusion. Moreover, analysing the solutions produced by
the maximum entropy approach enables clearer differentiation between the default knowledge they
contain and the default inferences required of the reasoning system. This suggests that the maximum
entropy approach can be used as a benchmark both for eliciting default knowledge when building a
knowledge base and, by comparison, for clarifying the underlying biases of other default reasoning
systems.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A common intuition is that a default represents a general rule that may admit excep-
tions, e.g., “women are bad drivers”. Rather than having a truth value, such rules can be
thought of as existing as part of some reasoner’s background knowledge. In conjunction
with known factual information about the world, defaults are used to derive new, defeasible
beliefs about the most plausible state of the world, subject to retraction if conflicting fac-
tual information comes to light. The question arises: how does the reasoner use its default
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knowledge? That is, how can a set of defaults be systematically processed to ensure that the
output indeed represents the most plausible state of the world? Perhaps more importantly,
what does “most plausible” actually mean?
This paper attempts to answer these questions by arguing that an existing system—the
extended maximum entropy approach or ME+approach [4,10]—provides a formal theory
of default reasoning that can be used as a benchmark. This is not to imply that other default
systems are “wrong”, but when used as a tool for comparison, the ME+approach can help
to clarify the assumptions on which other systems are based, and hence assist in their
evaluation. The paper is intended to give a high level argument, rather than a very technical
one, demonstrating both that the ME+approach indeed corresponds to default intuitions,
which have been so hard to capture precisely, and that it provides a model from which to
explain what these intuitions may involve.
The paper is arranged as follows: in the next section, an overview of the default rea-
soning process is followed by justification of the use of maximum entropy to establish a
benchmark default reasoning mechanism; in Section 3, an overview of the extended max-
imum entropy approach is given; in Section 4, the common intuitions of default reasoning
are analysed using the ME+approach; in Section 5, the ME+approach is applied in the
context of building a default knowledge base to demonstrate its use as a means of eliciting
default knowledge; Section 6 concludes.
2. Defaults, default reasoning and maximum entropy
Default reasoning is broadly a process by which a set of default rules are manipulated
to arrive at defeasible beliefs. There are various frameworks which accomplish this in-
cluding default logic [31], circumscription [23], preferential reasoning [16], and reasoning
using rational consequence relations [18]; other closely related systems include inheritance
hierarchies [12,37] and conditional logics [15,25]. The meaning of defaults in these frame-
works differs, and they may or may not involve the reasoner incorporating facts about the
world in order to come to conclusions. However, one way or another, all these systems
require that the user input some set of defaults representing his background knowledge,
and result in further default conclusions being produced. A distinction therefore needs to
be drawn between the inputs—the default knowledge—and the outputs—the default infer-
ences: the former represent the user’s firm beliefs about how the world usually behaves,
while the latter represent other, defeasible beliefs about how one may suppose the world
to behave based on the original defaults. It is not always easy to distinguish these differ-
ent types of information since they often have an identical structure (i.e., they are both
defaults), but by doing so, it is possible to come to a clearer understanding of the process
of default reasoning and hence have realistic expectations of what it should be capable of
achieving.
The framework for default reasoning which paints a clear picture of this process, is
that described by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor in their influential paper on cumulative
and preferential reasoning [16]; indeed, preferential logics were originally proposed as a
framework for capturing the behaviour of any system of nonmonotonic reasoning [33].
By considering a system of default inference as a means of extending a set of defaults, it
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becomes obvious that the original set represents the background knowledge and the extra
defaults in the extension are the default inferences. Thus, any method for extending a set of
defaults defines a system of default reasoning. The question becomes: which system best
represents the default intuitions so widely held, and why do some examples confound these
intuitions and lead to disagreements?
Certainly, many systems, including preferential reasoning itself, fail to exhibit some
intuitions which are widely considered necessary to fully account for default reasoning.
While preferential conclusions are rarely disputed, more complex behaviours appear to be
required; where these come from, and exactly what they involve, has never been defined
precisely. These extra behaviours have mainly been illustrated through examples with in-
tuitively obvious default conclusions; while such examples do illustrate common patterns
of default reasoning, they do not help to explain how such patterns arise, nor how more
complex interactions among defaults should be resolved.
Rather than designing a default reasoning system in order to satisfy the examples, what
is needed is a means of capturing the underlying concepts which cause default intuitions to
arise. It has been shown, separately by Shore and Johnson [34,35] and by Paris and Vencov-
ská [27,28], that maximum entropy (ME) inference is the only sound and coherent model of
inductive inference. From simple assumptions of consistency and independence, and using
different methods of analysis, two distinct derivations of the uniqueness of the maximum
entropy method are possible. Kern-Isberner derives a third, more specific, characterisation
of inference using ME, in the context of quantified probabilistic conditionals [15]. Again it
is shown that ME inference is the only solution to the update problem. Kern-Isberner also
uses ME updating to demonstrate the validity of some deduction rules of conditional logic
[25]—for example, transitivity, specificity and reasoning by cases [14]. However, since
ME updating is a global inference strategy, and the deduction rules apply to subsets of
probabilistic conditionals, the results are only valid in isolation as other conditionals may
affect the updating process. The sanctioning of common patterns of plausible inference
under ME, albeit invalid if applied only locally, offers some evidence that commonsense
reasoning follows the underlying principle of indifference which ME incorporates, as has
been argued elsewhere [26].
Given these findings that maximum entropy provides a logical and consistent means
of inference from uncertainty [13,35]—indeed the only one—and given that there is no
general agreement on a benchmark system of default reasoning, it is useful to consider the
validity of default intuitions in the context of maximum entropy. The extended maximum
entropy approach [4,5] is derived by applying ME to the ε-semantics [1,29], a sound and
clear semantics for preferential reasoning based on probability theory. This paper shows
that the resultant system, motivated soley by probability theory and ME, allows the whole
gamut of default intuitions to be recovered and, hence, explained.
3. The extended maximum entropy approach
First some preliminary definitions and notation. A finite propositional language L is
made up of propositions a, b, c, . . . and the usual connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →. A default
rule, e.g., a⇒ b, is a pair of propositions or propositional formulas joined by a default
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connective ⇒, which should not be confused with material implication →. The language
L has a finite set of models,M. A model,m, is said to verify a default, a⇒ b, if m |= a∧b,
where |= is classical entailment, and is said to falsify or violate it if m |= a∧¬b. The default
a⇒¬b is called the converse of a⇒ b.
The ε-semantics [1,29] for a default is that it represents a constraint on a probability
distribution such that the conditional probability associated with a default, a⇒ b, is con-
strained to be greater than 1− ε for some infinitesimal parameter ε > 0.
(1)a⇒ b ≡ P(b|a) 1− ε.
The exact value of ε is not relevant since it is merely a parameter used to link together
the constraints associated with a set of defaults. Given that default information is intended
to represent general rules of the form “if a then, normally, b”, the associated conditional
probability is assumed to be relatively high and so the parameter ε is taken to be a real
number close to zero.
In the original ME approach, developed by Goldszmidt [10], the ε-semantics is ex-
tended using maximum entropy to select one probability distribution from all those that
satisfy the default constraints. The unique maximum entropy distribution so defined is
then abstracted to a ranking function that determines the rational consequences of a set
of defaults. The ε-semantics sanctions default conclusions whose order of magnitude con-
straints exist in the limit as the uncertainties are made arbitrarily small; more colloquially,
this can be thought of as taking one’s assumptions to the extreme. Using maximum entropy
this process is further refined: the entropy of a probability distribution is a measure of the
uncertainty inherent in it [13]; by choosing the ME distribution, the uncertainty is max-
imised, leading to the most indifferent distribution satisfying the defaults; any distribution
with a lower entropy can be thought of as being biased towards one default or another,
hence the ME ranking is the least biased [35].
The extended ME approach [4,5] adapts the original ME approach in two ways. The
first adaptation is that, using the abstraction to ranking functions, it extends the seman-
tics of individual defaults to incorporate variable priorities or relative strengths. Under the
ε-semantics, when a user specifies a default, he believes that the probability that the default
will be violated is extremely small, but not zero—he allows a small amount of uncertainty
that the default may not be verified. Using defaults with relative strengths means that the
uncertainties associated with some defaults are orders of magnitude smaller than those
of other defaults; with no intuitions about defaults’ relative strengths, all are simply as-
signed the same strength. It should be noted that when all defaults have equal strength, the
ME+approach subsumes the original ME approach and both systems sanction the same
conclusions.
The second adaptation is to the constraints used to represent defaults, which are, in a
sense, loosened to better reflect the fact that they will be abstracted. Thus for a default
ai ⇒ bi , Goldszmidt uses the constraint:
(2)P(bi |ai) 1− ε
to represent the fact that as ε→ 0, the probability of finding bi to be true when ai is true
tends to one. In the ME+approach, each default is assigned a strength, si , written ai
si⇒ bi ,
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and the constraint becomes:(3)P(bi |ai) 1−Oi
(
εsi
)
where the function Oi(εsi ), termed a convergence function, has a specific order of mag-
nitude corresponding to the strength of the default, but an unspecified convergence coeffi-
cient. The motivation for this is that since the coefficients will be lost when the probability
distribution is abstracted into a ranking function, it is inappropriate that they be specified in
the defaults. This different interpretation of defaults has an impact on the result of applying
the maximum entropy technique. Whereas, the original ME approach determines a unique
solution, in the ME+approach there are different solutions corresponding to the different
strengths assigned to the defaults. However, this comes at a price; because the constraints
associated with defaults are only determined up to their order of magnitude, there may
also be multiple solutions even for the same default strength assignment. Such cases occur
when the set of defaults contains redundancy which can potentially be ambiguous. In prac-
tice, such pathological cases turn out to be unusual—where they do occur it can indicate
that the default set itself needs to be more clearly specified. An example of this occurs in
Section 4.4.
After the principle of maximum entropy has been applied, by allowing ε→ 0, a ranking
function abstraction to the ME+solution is obtained. The ME+ranking for a set of variable
strength defaults, ∆= {ri :ai si⇒ bi} is given by solving the coupled equations:
(4)ME+(m)=
∑
ri
m|=ai∧¬bi
ME+(ri ),
(5)ME+(ai ∧ bi)+ si  ME+(ai ∧¬bi)
in which each default, ri , influences the ranking according to its integer weight, or
ME+rank, ME+(ri ). A mathematical derivation of these equations and an algorithm for
solving them is given in [5].
From (4), it can be seen that the ME+rank of any model (or state) is determined by
summing the weights of those defaults it falsifies. If a model falsifies no defaults, it will
have rank 0, and, in general, the more defaults a model falsifies, the more abnormal (higher
ranked) it becomes. The weights associated with the ME+solution reflect both a default’s
structural relevance to the other defaults in ∆ and its strength; because of the indifference
achieved by using ME, in some sense the weights reflect the least biased estimate of a
default’s relative importance. A default is ME+entailed if its lowest ranked verifying model
is strictly lower than its lowest ranked falsifying model.
Interestingly, many other default systems have used similar methods which assign some
sort of weight to a default, and which use the default violations to assess each model’s
worth; examples include systems Z and Z+ [11], lexicographic entailment [17], LCD be-
lief functions [3] and penalty logics [7]. The difference between these systems and the
ME+approach is that the latter is derived in a mathematically sound way directly from the
ε-semantics rather than being an intuitively motivated, but ultimately ad hoc, invention.
The application of the ME+approach can be illustrated through a simple example. Con-
sider the following default knowledge base which represent the two defaults that birds
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Table 1
The ME+ranks for models using ∆1
m b f p r1 r2 ME+(m)
m1 0 0 0 – – 0
m2 0 0 1 – f s2
m3 0 1 0 – – 0
m4 0 1 1 – f s2
m5 1 0 0 f – s1
m6 1 0 1 f v s1
m7 1 1 0 v – 0
m8 1 1 1 v v 0
usually fly and that parrots are usually birds.
∆1 =
{
r1 :b
s1⇒ f, r2 :p
s2⇒ b}.
This results in two constraint equations:
(6)ME+(b ∧ f )+ s1  ME+(b ∧¬f ),
(7)ME+(p ∧ b)+ s2  ME+(p ∧¬b)
along with 8 equations for the ranks of the models. Table 1 shows each model and whether
or not it falsifies each of the defaults. The final column gives the ME+rank of the model.
For this example, the ME+solution is can easily be calculated to find that the ME+rank
of each default is simply its strength (this is because the defaults do not interfere in any
way, i.e., they are independent).
ME+(r1)= s1, ME+(r2)= s2.
To determine whether or not any particular default is ME+entailed, that is, belongs to
the ME+extension of ∆1, one examines the target default’s minimal verifying and falsify-
ing models. Take the default p⇒ f , that is, “do parrots usually fly?”
ME+(p ∧ f )= 0 < ME+(p ∧¬f )=min(s1, s2).
Because the verifying model is strictly lower, the default is indeed ME+entailed. It is pos-
sible to determine the strength of the entailment which is just the difference between these
two ranks; in this case the default p⇒ f is ME+entailed with strength min(s1, s2).
4. Analysis of default intuitions
In this section, the ME+approach is applied to examples that illustrate the intuitive
patterns of default behaviour which are considered to be general requirements of default
reasoning systems, though no system has yet captured all such behaviours. Unfortunately,
one of the problems with designing default reasoning systems is that attempting to de-
fine precisely what these so-called benchmark behaviours should be is rather a circular
argument—if the behaviours could be specified precisely, then that specification would
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represent a blueprint from which to build a system; on the other hand, without a precise
specification, there is plenty of room for differences of opinion since intuitions can be
highly subjective.
Despite these rather negative remarks, several authors have attempted to draw up a list
of requirements (see, for example, [3,20]). While those presented here roughly follow the
“desirable properties” listed in [3], some license has been taken with the description of
what those properties represent. Thus each behaviour is itself subjected to a short analysis
before the behaviour of the ME+solutions are discussed. In the main, these behaviours
relate to some form of inheritance, e.g., when should a property be inherited by a subclass,
when should it be blocked, on what does this depend, etc. By the end of this section, it is
hoped that the reader will at least agree that the ME+approach handles all default intuitions
satisfactorily; further, the reader may accept that using the ME+approach is a candidate for
a normative model of default reasoning.
4.1. Property inheritance, transitivity and irrelevance
The logical property of transitivity, that is, from a→ b and b→ c deduce a→ c, has
been a thorn in the side of nonmonotonic reasoning. One of the main uses of defaults is
to encode generalised knowledge concisely in terms of rules (e.g., normally birds fly), but
the fact that these are not logical and admit exceptions means that the transitive transfer of
properties, or normal inheritance, must sometimes be blocked. Clearly for nonmonotonic
reasoning, transitivity does not hold unilaterally.
Makinson pointed out that transitivity can be separated into two more basic inference
rules: cumulative transitivity1 and monotony [21]. He suggested that nonmonotonic rea-
soning processes need only satisfy the first of these conditions. Makinson’s analysis, along
with that of Gabbay [8], ultimately led to the formulation of the rule system P, as core be-
haviour for nonmonotonic reasoning systems [16]. But it appears that this set of rules is the
limit in terms of attempting to formalise nonmonotonic behaviour using rules of inference.
As Lehmann and Magidor subsequently found, more sophisticated rules such as rational
monotonicity lead to multiple solutions [18].
The real difficulty lies in attempting to impose a property such as transitivity as a rule of
inference, or as a constraint. It is far better to view it as a property one would expect to find
unless an exceptional circumstance exists, i.e., an observable phenomenon whose absence
indicates an exception has occurred.
The role of transitivity has led to much confusion both in the design of default systems
and in how to represent default knowledge. An example of this was the refusal to accept
a transitive conclusion from default logic in the following case [32]. Reiter and Criscuolo
argued that from the two defaults “typically high school dropouts are adults” and “typically
adults are employed”, it was undesirable to conclude that “typically high school dropouts
are employed”. They went on to say:
1 Equivalent to cautious monotonicity.
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Nor would we want to conclude that “Typically high school dropouts are not employed.”
Rather we would remain agnostic about the employment status of a typical high school
dropout.
For whatever reasons, presumably preconceived ideas about high school dropouts, the
results of the reasoning process were prejudged. By requiring that it remain agnostic about
a particular default conclusion, an additional constraint was unwittingly imposed. This
neatly illustrates the importance of distinguishing between default knowledge and default
inference: wishing to remain agnostic was problem specific information that was not sup-
plied to the reasoning mechanism.
To resolve their dilemma, Reiter and Criscuolo resorted to using “semi-normal” defaults
so that the desired conclusions could be obtained. In effect, they were having to block
the transitive conclusions which default logic naturally produced. This led to unwanted
side effects both in terms of extra, counterintuitive conclusions being sanctioned, and of
multiple or non-existent extensions to default theories. A similar situation occurs with
circumscription, where it becomes necessary to introduce abnormality predicates so that
the “correct” results can be obtained [19,23]. But this presupposes the default inferences
required, ultimately invalidating the use of a system of default reasoning! After all, if one
knew all the conclusions in advance, in theory one could simply program a system to
reproduce them. By using defaults, the hope is to provide a concise representation of some
domain and a mechanism for extracting a plausible view of the whole picture. Although
this often involves what looks like transitive inference, it is a mistake to force a default
system to behave in this way, or to prevent it, since this will undoubtedly lead to incorrect
conclusions in some cases.
In the previous section, the example used to illustrate the ME+approach in practice was
a simple case of transitivity, that is, from the database:
∆1 =
{
r1 :b
s1⇒ f, r2 :p
s2⇒ b}
it was shown that p ⇒ f is an ME+consequence regardless of the strengths assigned
to the defaults (though s1 and s2 do affect the degree of the inference). Another way to
view this is to notice that both falsifying models of p⇒ f , must either falsify p⇒ b or
b⇒ f , whereas p⇒ f has a verifying model, p ∧ b ∧ f , that does not falsify either; so
p⇒ f is unconditionally ME+entailed by ∆. The uncontroversial conclusion given by the
ME+approach is that the ability to fly is normally inherited in a transitive way. Whether
defaults are viewed as some kind of inference rule, or as constraints, it seems hard to argue
that p⇒ f should not be a default conclusion of this set, at least when the abstract symbols
are not loaded with intuitive interpretations.
What this shows is that, in isolation, defaults do chain transitively under the ME+ap-
proach. A similar observation is made by Kern-Isberner in her paper on probabilistic
conditionals [14]. Obviously, other defaults which deal with the same propositions or for-
mulas, may cause interference which prevents this from happening, but, other things being
equal, transitivity is to be expected.
Since transitive behaviour is normal in unexceptional circumstances, it is not surprising
that it is a property which has been isolated and considered important. This simple example
also demonstrates that, if it is accepted that ME+entailment represents the least biased
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consequence relation, it can be used to discover the hidden biases which exist in one’s
knowledge. Any unusual conclusions or side effects reflect differences in the problem as
it has been encoded and the implicit constraints which the user has failed to encode. An
example of this process is given in Section 5.
4.1.1. Irrelevance
Related to the problem of being able to correctly perform property inheritance is the
ability to do so in the presence of irrelevant information. Some default systems, especially
those based on the ε-semantics, have suffered from the inability to ignore extraneous infor-
mation. For example, the default a ∧ c⇒ b is not ε-entailed by the singleton set {a⇒ b}.
This problem arises because the ε-semantics sanctions only defaults whose constraints are
satisfied by all distributions compatible with the initial set. Some of these distributions may
also satisfy the set {a⇒ b, a ∧ c⇒¬b}, so a ∧ c⇒ b cannot be ε-entailed, even when c
is a completely irrelevant proposition. In contrast, nonmonotonic reasoning systems which
allow a form of transitivity, such as default logic and circumscription, do not suffer from
this problem exactly because inheritance is blocked explicitly by the relevant formulas.
Under the ME+approach, models in which some irrelevant formula is true and those in
which it is false are treated equally. Returning to the example above, ∆1 ME+entails not
only p⇒ f but also p ∧ x⇒ f and p ∧ ¬x⇒ f , for any x not previously mentioned,
under any strength assignment. Thus the requirement of ignoring irrelevant information is
satisfied by the ME+approach.
4.2. Conflicting inheritance and specificity
A primary requirement of default reasoning is surely that it only sanction default con-
clusions which are, in some way, justifiable. The complement of this is that, when there is
no reasonable conclusion to come to, it should remain ambivalent. The classic example of
this behaviour is given by the so-called Nixon diamond:
∆2 =
{
r1 :a
s1⇒ c, r2 :b
s2⇒¬c}.
In this example, two defaults with differing antecedents point to opposite conclusions.
While the defaults do not conflict directly, if both their antecedents are satisfied simulta-
neously, it becomes unclear whether or not any default conclusion can be reached. The
question is, if an object exhibits both properties a and b, should it inherit property c, ¬c,
or neither?
The ME+solution to this example is straightforward; in fact, the ME+rank of each de-
fault is, again, simply its strength: ME+(r1)= s1 and ME+(r2)= s2. This leads to behaviour
which captures the intuition that, when the problem is symmetrical (when s1 = s2), ambi-
guity is preserved and neither a ∧ b⇒ c nor a ∧ b⇒ ¬c is ME+entailed; however, if
either strength dominates the other, then that default takes priority and the corresponding
conclusion is sanctioned; for example, if s2 > s1, then a ∧ b⇒¬c is ME+entailed. Note
that in such a case the strength of the inference is weakened by the presence of conflict so
that the conclusion is only ME+entailed to degree s2 − s1.
This result seems appropriate: when there is no reason to prefer one conclusion over
another, no firm conclusion can be reached, but if one default is stronger its conclusion will
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prevail. In this case, the ME+solution resolves the conflict because it treats each default in
the same way while taking account of their assigned strengths. This allows the system to
come to completely different default conclusions when the strengths are altered. Of course,
this does not mean that any default conclusion can be obtained by altering the strengths,
just that by tipping the balance in favour of one default or the other, this particularly simple
type of conflict can be resolved in an even-handed manner.
Whereas in the above example, the strengths were the deciding factor, in other cir-
cumstances, it may be the structure of the interaction between defaults which forces the
conclusion one way or another, regardless of relative strengths. This structural prioritisa-
tion of defaults has been termed specificity [30] since one default may relate to a more
specific situation than another, and therefore override the application of less specific, con-
flicting defaults.
Consider the addition of an extra default, a
s3⇒ b, to ∆2 above:
∆3 =
{
r1 :a
s1⇒ c, r2 :b
s2⇒¬c, r3 :a
s3⇒ b}.
Again, in this example, the ME+solution is particularly simple; the ME+ranks of defaults
are given by ME+(r1)= s1 + s2, ME+(r2)= s2, ME+(r3)= s2 + s3.
Now consider again whether an object which exhibits both properties a and b, inherits
property c, ¬c, or neither. The ME+ranks of the relevant models are:
ME+(a ∧ b ∧ c)= s2 and ME+(a ∧ b ∧¬c)= s1 + s2.
The default conclusion a ∧ b⇒ c is ME+entailed to degree s1, regardless of the values for
the strengths s1 and s2; in particular, it makes no difference if s2 > s1; such a conclusion
might be said to be unconditionally ME+entailed.2 This is a good example of how the
ME+approach handles specificity: because a is effectively a subclass of b (as witnessed
by the default a ⇒ b), the default which refers to a specifically in its antecedent takes
priority over that which refers only to b, the superclass. An interesting observation for this
particular example is that, because it is the more specific default, a⇒ c, which is active,
the derived default conclusion is ME+entailed to the same degree as that which caused it.
The way the conflict is handled under the ME+approach illustrates neatly exactly which
defaults are involved in the inheritance and which are blocked.
Together, the Nixon diamond and its extension,3 illustrate two different ways in which
the ME+approach handles conflict resolution among default interactions. When defaults
are of equal status, conflicts can be resolved by examining the relative strengths of the
defaults involved, with the possibility for preserving ambiguity when there is no bias one
way or the other. When there is an implicit structural priority over defaults, with one being
applicable in a more specific circumstance than the other, the relative strengths are imma-
terial and the conflict is resolved in favour of the more specific default. The fact that both
types of conflict resolution are handled naturally by the ME+approach—that is, they were
2 In fact, a ∧ b⇒ c is an ε-consequence of ∆2.
3 Isomorphic to the classic “penguins do not fly” example (substitute a for “penguin”, b for “bird”, c for “not
fly”).
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not design specifications but are purely a result of the chosen semantics—leads one to ex-
pect that these conflicts will be resolved in a similarly reasonable manner for larger and
more complicated default interactions.
4.3. Exceptional inheritance
Inheritance to exceptional subclasses has been one of the most difficult behaviours to ob-
tain from default systems. The intuition is that property inheritance should not be blocked
for exceptional subclasses except for those properties which make them exceptional. This
can be seen either as just a special case of transitivity which occurs for the unexceptional
cases but not the exceptional ones, or as a presumption that defaults hold unless there is
information to the contrary. The assumption is that the information about an exceptional
feature should not affect other features of the same status or at the same level.
Another argument in favour of exceptional inheritance is that, although exceptions to
defaults are known to be a possibility, the reason that a superclass exists at all is because
objects have been classified according to their common features or because they exhibit
similar properties. Thus objects which belong to the same class should be similar in all
features unless they are known explicitly not to be, meaning that as many typical features
as possible should be inherited.
This is another case where, although illustrative examples may have intuitively appeal-
ing conclusions, in more complex cases, it is not clear whether or not exceptional properties
should be inherited. While the ME+approach handles this “correctly” for the following ex-
ample, it is also flexible in the way it achieves this, leaving room for nonmonotonic changes
in inference if conflicting defaults are subsequently added.
∆4 =
{
r1 :b
s1⇒ f, r2 :p
s2⇒ b, r3 :p
s3⇒¬f, r4 :b
s4⇒w}.
The intended interpretation of these defaults is that birds normally fly, penguins are nor-
mally birds, penguins normally do not fly and birds normally have wings. The question is
whether penguins can inherit the wing attribute of birds despite being exceptional.
This problem again has a simple ME+solution for any strength assignment given by
ME+(r1)= s1, ME+(r2)= s1 + s2, ME+(r3) = s1 + s3, and ME+(r4)= s4. It follows that
some default conclusions hold unconditionally, in particular, the default p⇒w, is uncon-
ditionally ME+entailed (there are always minimal verifying models of it which are more
normal than its falsifying models), although the strength assignment may dictate which
defaults are actually responsible for the inheritance. If, on the one hand, s2 < s4, then the
fact that falsifying p⇒ b is more serious than falsifying b⇒ f leads to p⇒ w being
ME+entailed; if, on the other hand, s4 < s2, then the reason for inheritance is simply be-
cause fewer defaults are violated. Interestingly, the degree to which p⇒w is ME+entailed
depends on the strength of either p⇒ b or b⇒ w, whichever is weaker, giving support
to the view that an argument is only as strong as its weakest link. Thus the ME+approach
sanctions the transitive conclusion p⇒w but prohibits p⇒ f .
Further examination of this default database indicates that there comes a point when,
rather than exceptional inheritance occurring, it is possible to doubt that an unusual object
is even a member of the class to which it is purported to belong. For example, consider
whether a wingless penguin should still be considered a bird despite being unusual in a
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number of ways. That is, consider whether the default p ∧¬w⇒ b is ME+entailed. The
ME+ranks of the relevant models are:
ME+(p ∧¬w ∧ b)= s1 + s4 and ME+(p ∧¬w ∧¬b)= s1 + s2.
Thus the default p ∧¬w⇒ b is a controversial ME+conclusion—it may be ME+entailed
but so may its converse. The resolution of this controversy depends solely on the strengths
assigned to the defaults r2 and r4, i.e., how strongly penguins are birds relative to birds
having wings.
The reason the ME+approach handles inheritance to exceptional subclasses so ele-
gantly, is because it assesses the models on the basis of a weighted sum of all defaults
falsified. But, as the ME+solution to this example indicates, there may be different rea-
sons for the inheritance, dependent on the strengths used, implying that the causes of
exceptional inheritance are not clearcut. Perhaps this goes some way to explaining why
exceptional inheritance has been so difficult to formalise, and why Weydert has derived an
“impossibility” result for systems which are forced to satisfy it [38].
4.4. Multiple inheritance
In some sense, multiple inheritance is an extension of the conflict resolution already
examined in Section 4.2. This section demonstrated that the ME+approach “weighs” up
these conflicts, balancing both the structure of the problem and the relative strengths of
defaults. This leads to some interesting insights into this complex issue, much debated in
the field of inheritance hierarchies [36]. The main point is that while a default set may lead
to unconditional default conclusions, these may still be nonmonotonically retracted if the
addition of new defaults changes the structure of the problem.
To illustrate this phenomenon, an extension of a well-known controversial example is
analysed. The original version is discussed at length in several papers [22,24,37]. The
default set is given by:
∆5 =
{
r1 :a
s1⇒ b, r2 : c
s2⇒ b, r3 :b
s3⇒ d, r4 :a
s4⇒¬d, r5 : c
s5⇒ d}.
In view of its history, an illustration appears in Fig. 1.
The controversy surrounding this example involves whether or not the default “marine-
chaplains are beer drinkers” (a ∧ c ⇒ d), or its converse, is a default conclusion. In
the original example, the direct link from marine to beer drinker, r5, is omitted and the
ME+solution is unique giving an unconditional ME+consequence of a ∧ c⇒ ¬d (i.e.,
“marine-chaplains are not beer drinkers”). This result is unsurprising since the link be-
tween chaplains and beer drinker is clearly more specific than that between beer drinker
and marine which is via man. In other words, chaplains are known to be men who are
known to be beer drinkers, so the fact that a chaplain is also a marine should not affect
the conclusion that he does not drink beer. After all, marines are only known to be beer
drinkers by virtue of being men, at least as represented in the original example.
However, Touretzky et al. [37] speculated that if marines were known to be heavier
drinkers than men in general, then this could affect the conclusion for marine-chaplains.
To represent this, the additional extra default r5 : c
s5⇒ d is added, creating a direct link
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between marine and beer drinker. Now this default is already an ME+consequence of the
original set and is ME+entailed to degree min(s2, s3). This means that the ME+solution to
the extended example is a complex one, reflecting the fact that some rules become redun-
dant under some strength assignments; in this case whenever s5  min(s2, s3). However,
if s5 > min(s2, s3), all defaults are active giving an ME+solution of ME+(r1) = s1 + s3,
ME+(r2)= s2, ME+(r3)= s3, ME+(r4)= s3 + s4 and ME+(r5)= s5 −min(s2, s3).
In this case, the ME+conclusion is still a controversial one. The minimal verifying and
falsifying models of a ∧ c⇒¬d are:
ME+(a ∧ c ∧¬d) : ME+(a ∧ c∧ d)
s3 + s5 −min(s2, s3) : s4
and the result depends critically on the strengths.
It appears that multiple inheritance is bound to lead to ambiguous situations; however,
this example demonstrates that the ME+approach can be used to disentangle the ambigu-
ities which arise, since it can help to identify both the causes of controversy and how to
resolve them.
5. Eliciting default knowledge
Using the ME+approach necessarily involves coming to some quite specific conclu-
sions, mainly because the result is a ranking function that totally orders the set of possible
world models. In fact, the use of rational consequence relations to represent default knowl-
edge has been criticised as too committed to ranking worlds by several researchers [2,9].
However, the conclusions which result from the ME+ranking can be justified as those most
likely to pertain if the defaults supplied are the only constraints which exist for the given
domain. In reality, of course, this is a crude and simplistic model, but despite this, it can
be used to elicit default knowledge from users since any significant deviations from the
conclusions obtained using the ME+approach, imply that extra, or different, constraints
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exist. This use of ME was suggested by Jaynes for finding physical constraints [13], but is
equally applicable to the more abstract problem of eliciting default knowledge.
There has already been an example of this process in action in Section 4.1: Reiter
and Criscuolo rejected the ME+consequence that “typically high school dropouts are em-
ployed” but admitted that they wished to remain “agnostic” on this point. This agnosticism
amounts to a further constraint on the problem that was not represented in the original de-
fault set. Rather than altering the reasoning mechanism to “correct” this problem, a more
accurate model of the background knowledge is required.
By constructing a set of defaults and examining its ME+consequences, usually by
initially assigning all defaults equal strengths, it is often possible to obtain a better un-
derstanding of the intuitions of the user both in terms of how the defaults interact and
whether any hold more strongly than others. This leads to a better translation of background
knowledge into default rules. The following construction of a knowledge base from some
background information illustrates how the ME+approach can be put to work in practice.
The example is taken from Brewka [6]:
Usually one has to go to a project meeting.
This rule does not apply if somebody is sick, unless he only has a cold.
The rule is also not applicable if somebody is on vacation.
Firstly, it should be noted that there are several ways in which one might choose to encode
this information. In particular, it is not obvious that the phrase unless he only has a cold
implies that having a cold is a type of sickness, although common sense tells us that this is
the case. There may be situations in which “unless” means only “if [something] happens
to be the case as well”. So the user must be aware of those of his intuitions which relate to
the semantics of everyday language and therefore need to be represented explicitly. Taking
this point on board, the following set is one way to represent the given information:
∆6 =
{
True
1⇒m, s 1⇒¬m, c 1⇒ s, c 1⇒m, v 1⇒¬m}
with the symbols standing for m meeting, s sick, c cold, and v vacation, and the strengths
of all defaults being equal, initially. (So the default True⇒ m is a direct translation of
“usually one has to go to a project meeting”.)
Secondly, the information as it stands does not indicate whether or not one should attend
the meeting if one has a cold but is on vacation. Although, intuitively, being on vacation
overrides going to work, this is not made explicit in the information above. This leads to an
interesting point. Is this conclusion a semantic intuition or a structural one? That is, should
it be represented explicitly as an extra default, or should it be a derivable conclusion? This
is the type of decision that the ME+approach can help the user to make when building his
knowledge base.
Given ∆6 as it stands, the default c ∧ v ⇒ ¬m is an ME+consequence, but it is a
controversial one. By increasing the strength of the default c⇒ m to 2, the default is no
longer ME+entailed, while increasing it further, to 3 or higher, means that the converse,
i.e., c ∧ v⇒m, is ME+entailed. To ensure that the “intuitive” conclusion holds, it is nec-
essary for the strength of the default v⇒¬m to be greater than or equal to that of c⇒m.
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The user must therefore decide whether the default set is sufficient as it stands, so that alter-
ing the strengths, or adding extra defaults, might lead to a different conclusion; or whether,
in fact, this intuition is a further constraint which needs to be made explicit and added to
the default set.
What the example illustrates is that it is important, as a user, to be able to distinguish
between different types of intuition: structural and semantic. While it is the responsibility
of the default reasoning mechanism to handle the structural interactions of defaults, i.e., to
satisfy the requirements of default reasoning as discussed in Section 4, this will only pro-
duce the “correct” answers if the user has correctly encoded his semantic intuitions about
the propositions. The ME+approach can assist him in clarifying his intuitions because it
treats all defaults equally, giving unbiased conclusions enabling the user to determine both
the nature and extent of his own biases.
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the ME+approach can represent many forms of default intu-
itions, including complex behaviours like multiple inheritance, despite the simplicity of its
underlying motivation and semantics. Using the system as a benchmark, it is possible to
differentiate between the default knowledge encoded in standard examples and the behav-
iour which is being asked of a default inference system. Furthermore, the system itself can
be used in comparison with other default systems, clarifying the implicit semantics which
they assign to defaults and default inference.
Because of this, it is argued that the default conclusions sanctioned under the
ME+approach represent the fundamental default inferences obtainable from a given set
of defaults. A user who expects different default inferences must be using other constraints
not encoded in his set of defaults; unbeknown to him, he has failed to encode implicit in-
formation he is using. This makes the extended ME+approach an ideal tool for examining
default intuitions themselves.
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